

JPRS 78152

26 May 1981

Vietnam Report

No. 2274

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

26 May 1981

VIETNAM REPORT

No. 2274

CONTENTS

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

Role of Border Defense Troops Discussed (Huynh Thu; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Jan 81)	1
Army's Economic Development Mission Discussed (Bui Phung; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Jan 81)	9
Editorial Underlines Improvement of Militia, Self-Defense Forces (Editorial; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 20 Feb 81)	18
Runaways by Sea Turned Pirates (Pham Xuan Luc; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 18 Feb 81)	20

LABOR

Editorial Urges Rational Work Norm Achievement (Editorial; NHAN DAN, 3 Apr 81)	23
Agricultural Cooperatives Implement Product Contracts (Editorial; NHAN DAN, 2 Apr 81)	25

BIOGRAPHIC

Information on Vietnamese Personalities	27
---	----

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ROLE OF BORDER DEFENSE TROOPS DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [People's Army Review] in Vietnamese No 1, Jan 81 pp 56-64

[Article by Major General Huynh Thu: "The Border Defense Troops in the Enterprise of Defending the Homeland"]

[Text] The border defense troops are a component of the Vietnam People's Army and are a professional armed force that is within the regular organization of the state of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The border defense troops are a hard-core force in fulfilling the mission of defending the sovereignty of the homeland and maintaining the security of its borders. In each locality, in the process of fulfilling their missions, whether in wartime or peacetime, the border defense forces have very close relationships with the other forces, such as the local troops, the militia and self-defense forces, the regular troops operating in the locality, the port, customs, and financial police, etc. Therefore, the border defense troops are an important force of local people's war in the border and coastal areas and on islands.

Even while they were still part of the People's Public Security forces, the border defense troops played an especially important role in defending the sovereignty and territorial security of the independent Vietnamese state. During more than 20 years of combat and development along the borders, the border defense troops brilliantly fulfilled the missions of "suppressing all sabotage activities of the counterrevolutionaries in our country and counterrevolutionaries infiltrated from abroad to commit sabotage in our country, always being ready to fight to defend the security of the borders and coasts, defending the important economic and cultural bases, etc." assigned by the party and state.

In the people's war against the U.S. imperialist aggressors, in the north the border defense troops, along with the entire population and the other forces, promptly uncovered and suppressed acts of banditry, put down disturbances, captured spies and commandos, and defended sovereignty and maintained security in the border areas, at the frontier, on islands, and along the coast. They fought resolutely and bravely, resourcefully shot down or set afire hundreds of enemy airplanes and contributed, along with the entire nation, to defeating the war of destruction of the U.S. imperialists. At the same time, the border defense troops contributed to economic construction, promoting the three revolutions, building political bases in the border areas at the frontier, etc., thus creating great strength for the masses in defending the sovereignty and territorial security of the socialist north.

In the south the border defense forces, with the mission of being part of the liberation security forces, achieved many great accomplishments in the mission of defending the headquarters organs of the party, the Front, and the government, and positively participated in building bases, building mass movements to oppose the "pacification" and "open arms" programs, eliminated spies and tyrants, opposed the enemy's psychological warfare, and opposed all activities of the secret police and spies.

When our homeland was unified, the border defense troops clearly realized their role and mission in the enterprise of building socialism and defending the socialist homeland, rapidly deployed their forces throughout the nation, and began to fulfill the mission of defending each sacred inch of the homeland. During two wars to defend the homeland along the northern and southwestern borders against the Chinese aggressors and their lackeys, the border defense forces manifested a heroic spirit and fought bravely to defend the homeland's border and maintain political security and social order in the border areas, along the coast, and on the islands.

Today, with their function of being the hard-core force of the people's armed forces in order to defend the sovereignty and security of the border areas, on land, and at sea, the border defense troops have the responsibility of playing a new, very important role in the enterprise of defending and building the socialist Vietnamese homeland, and opposing the plot of the reactionary Beijing rulers to weaken, annex, and commit aggression against our country.

1. The border defense troops are a force which specializes in defending the sovereignty of the Vietnamese socialist state and enforcing its laws along the border, at sea, etc. They prevent and promptly punish all plots and illegal, destructive acts of external enemies and counterrevolutionaries. That is a very basic, permanent function of the border defense troops.

The struggle to enforce state laws and defend our sovereignty and territorial security is becoming increasingly complicated because the Chinese expansionists and the reactionary powers are using all destructing schemes causing political and social trouble and annexing and committing aggression against other countries. The border defense troops play a key role in the struggle against the enemy to defend the independence and sovereignty of our state along the border, at sea, and in the air, in accordance with the statutes of the Vietnamese socialist state. That is a very important struggle, with regard to politics, economics, society, national defense, diplomacy, etc., which the border defense troops must wage continually. In order to win victory in that struggle the border defense troops must truly be a force which firmly grasps the legal stipulations of our state regarding its sovereignty along the border and at sea, firmly grasps its specialized missions in the struggle to enforce laws along the border and at sea, and firmly grasps international laws recognized by our state regarding those matters. The border defense troops must also have basic knowledge of history, geography, ethnology, anthropology, law, military science, religion, etc., in order to wage a sharp struggle against the enemy.

In the process of struggling to defend sovereignty and security in the border and coastal areas, at sea, on islands, etc., the border defense troops must coordinate closely with the public security, customs, and public health forces as well as with the military forces operating in those areas of the homeland.

With regard to the friendly borders between our country and the fraternal countries of Laos and Kampuchea, the border defense troops play the leading role in enforcing the agreements and covenants regarding the borders which our government signed (or agreed to) with the governments of those countries. That is a certain way of assuring that the reactionaries do not take advantage of historical matters to sabotage the solidarity among the three countries, and to promptly uncover, and take the lead in smashing, their espionage, rebellion-inciting, and sabotage activities. The border defense troops have also positively contributed to consolidating and developing the friendship and combat solidarity among the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea.

2. The border defense troops are hard-core forces in the maintenance of political security and social order and safety in the border and coastal areas, at sea, and on islands.

In both wartime and peacetime, the border, coastal, and island areas are areas to which the enemy always pays attention in order to carry out acts of political, economic, and social sabotage in order to carry out their short-range and long-range schemes. Their activities are very sophisticated and wily. They make use of various facilities, including modern facilities. Especially, the alliance of many types of spies, sabotage elements and reactionaries with many different leaders and different specific objectives makes the mission of maintaining security in those areas even more complicated.

The actual situations in the border, coastal, and island areas have distinctive characteristics which the security defense task must study and resolve comprehensively and permanently. Those areas are the places of residence of many peoples, areas in which history has left behind a considerable number of problems regarding ethnic group relations, the territorial borders of the relevant countries, etc. They are places of refuge and activity of reactionary elements, hooligans, black-marketeers, people engaged in illegal livelihoods, criminals avoiding reeducation, etc.

That situation requires a specialized force to serve as the hard core in defending political security force which is pure politically, is steadfast, and is absolutely loyal to the state. The cadres and men in that force must have basic scientific knowledge of the management of border, coastal, and island areas, and have the technical ability to investigate and confirm the various affairs in order to reach conclusions with scientific bases. It must be a force capable of organizing the task of defending security in a professional, modern manner, on the basis of the experiences that have been accumulated and the modern knowledge of the world regarding those matters. At the same time, that force must be capable of organizing the security maintenance task broadly among the people and cooperate closely with the other forces. Such a force can only be the border defense troops, a sharp tool of the proletarian dictatorship in serving as the hard core in defending our territory, defending the people, defending the governmental administrations and the party organs as well as the solidarity bloc of the ethnic groups, protecting state secrecy, and promptly suppressing all opposing elements as well as the sabotage activities, provocations, and espionage of foreign reactionaries.

In the immediate period, the border defense troops must develop their hard-core role in maintaining security in the border and coastal areas, at sea, and on islands. We must concentrate on accurately and promptly uncovering the destructive plots and provocations of the Beijing expansionists, as well as their plots of large-scale aggression. We must teach the people how to defend against the shelling and reconnaissance and commando activities of the Chinese aggressors, in order to protect the lives and property of the people and the state, and guard the military and national defense secrets as well as the secrets of the state. The border defense troops must truly educate and organize their forces and decide upon measures to guard against and counter disturbances in those areas, so that they and the other forces can promptly and rapidly put down the disturbances fomented by the local bandits, the reactionaries, and the opposition elements.

3. The border defense troops are one of the combat forces which fight to defend the borders, coasts, and islands of the homeland.

The history of our people's wars against foreign aggression demonstrates that in the border and island areas our people have often fought very fiercely to oppose the provocations and acts of sabotage, as well as the acts of aggression, of the enemy. In the recent anti-U.S. war, such border defense posts as Nam Can, Hien Luong, Cu Bai, etc., became the objects of enemy attacks. In the war against the Chinese aggressors and their lackeys along the northern and southwestern borders, the Po Hen, Friendship Pass, Xa Mat, Tinh Bien and other posts became objectives of their attacks.

Today, the Chinese expansionists are unwilling to abandon their aggressive plots against our country and are engaging in increasingly insane provocations and sabotage activities in the border and coastal areas of our homeland. As a component of the armed forces deployed to fulfill the mission of defending our sovereignty and maintaining the border security and territorial integrity of the homeland, the border defense troops are a force which engages directly in combat to defend every inch of the sacred soil of the homeland. With their function of serving as a component of our armed forces on the front line, the border defense troops play an important role in the missions of, along with the other forces, fighting to halt the advance of the enemy troops at the very doorways to our homeland, defeating the enemy troops beginning with the very first battles, and creating conditions for the other forces to deploy and enter the battle in time to counterattack the aggressor troops.

4. The border defense troops serve as the hard core of the on-the-spot combat forces in the dominant battle status of local people's war in the border, coastal, and island areas.

In order to defend the inviolable territorial sovereignty of the state, our troops and people are building a solid, strong defensive network throughout our country, in order to take the initiative and promptly reply to all acts of sabotage and aggression of the Beijing reactionaries and the other reactionary powers everywhere and at all times. That defensive network is deployed to form a solid, powerful battlefield position throughout the nation and in each locality. The border defense troops are a force that is deployed in the dominant battlefield position of local people's war in the border, island, and coastal areas. They play a very important role in accurately and promptly uncovering all plots and acts of the enemy

and in, along with the other forces of the local soldiers and people, strongly defending the land, the lives and property of the people, and the wealth and natural resources of the nation.

With their advantages of being local forces which are familiar with the terrain, fully understand the situation of the people and the capabilities of the locality, clearly understand the enemy facing them, etc., the border defense troops can fully exploit their strength and contribute to creating a solid position of dominance for local people's war and to, along with the local soldiers and people, promptly and strongly attacking the enemy under all circumstances. And thanks to the combined strength of local people's war, the border defense troops can fulfill their role of being a component of the hard-core combat forces of the mastership-winning and offensive, offensive and mastership-winning battlefield positions of the localities in the border, island, and coastal areas.

On the basis of the function and role of the border defense troops in the enterprise of building and defending the socialist Vietnamese homeland, the border defense troops must fulfill the basic, immediate missions set forth by our party and state.²

One of the basic, permanent missions of the border defense troops is "Managing and defending national sovereignty and maintaining the security of the homeland's borders and seas."

In order to fulfill that mission, the border defense troops must first of all fully understand the state's laws and other legal bases regarding its borders on land, at sea, and in the air, and grasp international law regarding those matters. On that basis, they must wage a resolute, skilled struggle to enforce the laws of our state regarding our national sovereignty and our sovereignty in the border and sea areas against all plots and acts which violate the sovereignty of our homeland. There are many historical complications regarding the borders shared by our country and the neighboring countries. Therefore, it is necessary to fully understand the historical documentation in order to struggle effectively and counter all artificial evidence and wily schemes of our adversaries.

In view of the adventuristic, obstinate acts of the enemy, who seek to attack and violate the sovereignty of our state, the border defense troops must promptly punish them whenever necessary. At times they must use their resolute actions to take the initiative in stopping their plots and acts. If that is to be accomplished they must promptly learn of, and seek ways to closely monitor, all enemy activities. Especially, there must be a system of management, combat alert, patrol, observation, reconnaissance, reporting, etc., that is professional, scientific, and solid and makes use of all forces and facilities. Depending on the conditions, we must positively build technical installations, including modern technical installations, to discover and stop acts by the enemy violate our sovereignty and threaten our security in the border areas.

They must, along with other forces such as the public security forces, the local troops, the self-defense militia, the police, etc., promptly suppress all sabotage and disturbance-inciting acts of the reactionaries in the interior of our country. They must tightly organize the monitoring and investigation of suspicious elements

and closely manage those elements in order to stop, and eliminate at the roots, the espionage, reconnaissance, and sabotage activities of lackeys in the locality or sent in from across the border. They must positively encourage and organize the people to participate in defending the security of the border areas, fully developing the capabilities of the people in discovering and preventing the sabotage activities of the enemy. That is a very important matter that is intended to protect the governmental administrations and party bases, to protect the lives of the people, the production bases, and the military and communications objectives, as well as protecting the ordinary activities in the people's lives in those areas.

They must do a good job of fulfilling the mission of "being prepared to fight, coordinate with the other armed forces and, along with the entire population, defeat the acts of aggression of the enemy." ³ In the present situation, when the Beijing expansionists are plotting to annex and invade our country, that is one of the foremost missions of the border defense troops.

As a force that is deployed in, and is responsible for defending the borders and seas of the homeland, the border defense troops must promptly respond to the enemy's acts of aggression, and are usually the first to open fire in fighting the enemy.

Our combat-readiness organization in the border areas and the other places is an organization with united, centralized command. As a component of the hard-core combat forces of local people's war in the border and coastal areas, the border defense troops must victoriously fulfill the combat missions assigned them and must have plans and measures for organizing combat-readiness and combat that are appropriate to the over-all combat plans and force deployments in the localities. In order to take the initiative in independent operations and in coordinated operations with the other armed forces in counterattacking the aggressor troops, the border defense troops must continually maintain a high degree of combat readiness in order to counterattack the enemy wherever and whenever they appear. First of all, the border defense forces must be fully aware of all enemy troop activities and must isolate their operational laws and grasp all aspects of the situation of the enemy facing them. On that basis, they must have correct combat-alert, patrolling, sentry, and alarm-sounding procedures, and assure that the entire unit enters the fighting actively, fights the enemy with the greatest possible strength, and never be caught off-guard by enemy surprise attacks.

They must determine the most appropriate combat mode on the basis of fully understanding the missions assigned them and comprehensively the missions assigned them and comprehensively analyzing our situation and that of the enemy. That mode must take into account the capabilities of the border defense troops under the conditions of not receiving support from the upper echelon or of losing contact with the other forces. The combat modes of the border defense troops in each area must be appropriate to the enemy-fighting plans of the local troops and people, and be solidly based on the combined fighting strength of the locality in order to fight over a long period of time.

In order to fulfill the above mission, the border defense troops must study, create, and develop their operational art, so that it is appropriate to their function, mission, organization, and equipment. That is the operational art of forces which are deployed in fixed border defense posts but are also mobile. Each border defense

unit must have operational art that is appropriate to the actual conditions of the enemy, the terrain, its own forces, and the local situation. But no matter what the situation, form, or scale of their operations, the operational art of the border defense troops must manifest the offensive concept and the concepts of achieving on-the-spot mastery, taking the initiative, and stubbornly fighting the enemy under all circumstances.

The fighting of the border defense troops, whether independent or in coordination with the other armed forces, lies within the over-all operational plans and the scope of local people's war, and is waged in close coordination with the troops of the provinces, the districts, and the regular, militia, and self-defense units on land, at sea, and on islands. Therefore, the border defense units must manifest a spirit of active coordination with those forces in fighting resolutely to oppose the aggressive acts of the enemy. They must know how to fully develop their fighting strength, contribute to the victorious fulfillment of the common missions, and carry out the strategic decisions of the party. Especially, they must absolutely obey and strictly carry out the combat orders and other directives of the highest-ranking commander in the operational areas of the border defense troops.

In the combat process, the border defense troops must do a good job of fulfilling their mission of defending sovereignty and maintaining security in the border areas. The border defense units must actively participate in fighting the reactionaries in the interior, uncovering and putting down disturbances, fighting and capturing commandoes, spies, and people illegally attempting to flee by sea, discovering and stopping saboteurs, and defending the governmental administrations and the lives and property of the people.

The border defense troops also have the mission of participating in all aspects of local development. That is a mission which manifests the revolutionary, popular is also manifested in acts to develop military-civilian solidarity.

First of all, the border defense troops must take the initiative in actively contributing to the establishment, consolidation, and development of the governmental administrations and party organizations, and to enabling those organs to develop great effectiveness in leading, managing, and implementing the stands and policies of the party and state toward the local ethnic groups. They must truly contribute to developing the socialist collective mastership role of the working people and the other people of the ethnic groups in the border areas, in the coastal areas, and on islands. They must participate in educating, enlightening, and increasing the sense of responsibility of the people with regard to the defense and development of the localities and the homeland. They must be exemplary in observing, and strictly carry out, the policies of the party and state toward the ethnic groups in those areas, and respect the customs, property, and lives of the ethnic peoples. Especially, they must contribute to fully developing the strength of the local people in organizing local defense, increasing fighting strength, and carrying out the policy of the entire population fighting the enemy.

The border defense troops must positively contribute to building pure and solid political bases in those areas. That amounts to continually consolidating and developing the solidarity and unity of the ethnic peoples on the basis of unanimity regarding, and determination to carry out, the party's line of building and defending the socialist homeland. It also amounts to continually raising the level of

revolutionary consciousness, patriotism, and love of socialism of the ethnic group peoples to create a solid basis on which to eliminate enmity and selfishness among the ethnic groups, and to smash the enemy's psychological warfare. Participating in the consolidation and development of the mass political organizations is a mission with which the border defense troops must be continually concerned. They must assure that such organizations can develop their strength in local development as well as in struggling against sabotage by the reactionaries.

On the basis of building strong, pure political bases, the border defense troops must positively help the localities build armed forces and political forces. The development of those forces must be in accordance with the mission of defending the homeland. First of all, it is necessary to concentrate on helping the localities build up the ranks of the corps of command and leadership cadres of the militia, self-defense, and security forces with regard to both quantity and quality. They must help the localities to consolidate the combat and combat-service organizations of those forces, to determine methods of fighting the enemy, to prepare the battlefield, to build combat positions, and to build rear-services bases. They must positively help the localities train the militia and self-defense forces.

Taking the initiative in developing production and the local economy is also an important mission. The border defense troops must contribute to consolidating the socialist production relationships, promoting production, and improving the material and spiritual lives of the ethnic group peoples. The border defense cadres and men must truly participate in building and consolidating the agricultural and forestry cooperatives and the local industrial production bases. Due to the characteristics of the border, island, and coastal areas, the border defense troops must contribute positively to opposing people engaged in illegal livelihoods, blackmarketing, etc.

To participate in all aspects of local development is also to develop the strength and potential for long-term fighting of the border defense troops. Therefore, the border defense cadres and men must sincerely be part of the locality; they must "regard the outpost as their home and the border area as their home area; and they must resolutely remain close to the land and people, be brothers to the ethnic peoples, and be prepared to sacrifice for the enterprise of defending the homeland and the border, for the sake of the sovereignty, peace, and happiness of the ethnic group peoples living along the sacred frontier of the homeland.

FOOTNOTES

1. Political Bureau Resolution No 58/NQ-TW, dated 19 November 1958, regarding the formation of the Armed People's Public Security Forces.

2. Excerpt from Decision 1148/QĐ/QP, dated 19 December 1979, of the Ministry of National Defense, regarding the basic missions of the border defense troops.

3. Ibid.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ARMY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MISSION DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN [People's Army Review] in Vietnamese No 1, Jan 81
pp 47-55

[Article by Lieutenant General Bui Phung: "The Army and Its Production Labor and Economic Missions in the New Situation"]

[Text] For more than 5 years now, under extremely difficult circumstances the people of our entire nation have endeavored very steadfastly and positively to heal the deep wounds of war, continually overcome serious aftereffects of natural disasters, restore and develop production, develop the economy, and build the nation. Therefore, although there are still many difficulties and deficiencies, we have by many means met the pressing needs of life and assured the great requirements of strengthening national defense and security, defeating the Chinese aggressors, and further developing the material-technical bases of socialism.

In the enterprise of developing economic potential and socialist transformation and construction throughout the nation, which our people have carried out for more than 5 years, and in which they have attained notable accomplishments, our people's armed forces have made an important contribution. The regular troops, the local troops, the militia and self-defense forces and the factories, enterprises, and rear-area base units of the army, including the units fulfilling combat readiness and combat missions along the border, on islands, and at sea, as well as the army units doing economic work, have urgently carried out their production and economic construction missions with differing scales, intensity, and operational modes.

In addition to maintaining and developing the movement to produce food and consumer goods in order to produce goods for society and improve the living conditions of the troops, our army has deployed a large force to fulfill economic missions in accordance with the state plans. The army forces specializing in economic work have undertaken many important economic construction missions in many areas with strategic importance regarding the combining of the economy and national defense. In the process of fulfilling the new missions, with many difficulties, deficiencies, and shortages regarding materials, equipment, finance, organization and management, specialized, professional, and technical matters, etc., a movement to compete in attaining high productivity and economic effectiveness was launched in all army units doing economic work and achieved definite accomplishments. Many new factors appeared, along with good accomplishments and rich experiences regarding the guidance, organization, and management of troops producing, improving living conditions,

and doing economic work in accordance with state plans. Those units were the corps, divisions, and regiments specializing in economic work, such as the Truong Son Corps, which builds bridges and roads; Regiment 50, which does irrigation work in the Mekong Delta; Regiment 5 B, building Route No 6; the units engaged in agricultural and forestry work at Krong Pach and Kon Ma Nung in the Central Highland, Group 2 in Military Region 3, etc. Such units always maintain a high degree of combat readiness along the border, along the coast, and on islands, but still do a good job of fulfilling their production missions, such as Group B26, the Chi Lang Group, Group 51, etc. They also include organs, factories, enterprises, schools, hospitals, and convalescent units which have done a good job of fulfilling their training missions and specialized, technical, and professional work, while also achieving good results on the production front, such as Group 200 in Military Region 4, the Lam Son Regiment 1 in Thanh Hoa Province, the military organ of Cam Binh District in Military Region 3, the Rear Services Department of the Rear Services General Department, Factory M 31 of the Technical General Department, the local troops of the provinces and districts in Military Region 9, etc.

Those accomplishments, as well as the experiences that have been gained in actual production labor, improving living conditions, and developing the economy in accordance with the state plans have affirmed that the party's policy of using the army to do economic work is entirely correct. Thanks to the army forces specializing in economic construction, our state has additional forces with which to fulfill the important, urgent economic missions, especially the missions of creating specialized agricultural and forestry zones in the important areas, building roads in the strategic areas, and transporting goods by air, as well as in the mission of economic cooperation with Laos. And with that large economic construction military force, our state has a ready source of supplementary combat forces. It relatively quickly transferred many units to combat missions and promptly met the great and urgent needs for combat forces for the two recent wars to defend the homeland. At the same time, some of those forces continued to fulfill economic construction missions. Those accomplishments are lively proof that our army firmly grasps the close relationship between the mission of defending the homeland and the mission of developing the nation in the new phase of the revolution. They also prove that under all circumstances our army is prepared to fight resolutely to defend the homeland and is ready to devote its all to the enterprise of building a rich, strong country. Those accomplishments also demonstrate our army's consciousness of collective mastery and spirit of resolutely carrying out the directives and resolutions of the party, and affirm its important role, very great capabilities, and good prospects on the new front, the front of production labor, economic construction, and national development.

The accomplishments of the army on the production labor and economic construction front during recent years are initial results which do not yet correspond to the requirements of the mission of economic construction and national development in the new situation, to the effort that has been invested, and to the army's still-great capabilities. The new situation and missions demand that our army strongly develop its fine qualities and traditions, and strengths, while also overcoming the deficiencies and weaknesses that have been exposed during the recent period in order to, that means, bring the development of offensive forces to the production labor and economic construction front with a new spirit that is intense, broad, and more urgent.

in order to contribute, along with the entire population, create a truly strong transformation beginning in 1981, and achieve momentum in promoting the attainment of the major objectives of the third five-year plan, our entire army must both have a very high degree of combat-readiness and positively participate in production labor and economic construction. Combat-readiness and combat are the most important, most sacred missions. Production labor and economic construction are extremely important missions which manifest the fine nature and traditions of our people's armed forces. They are also objective requirements of the revolutionary situation and tasks in the new phase.

At present, our entire nation is in the period of transition to socialism. An important and urgent matter is that we must simultaneously carry out the socialist construction and socialist transformation of the national economy. On the path of advance to the fulfillment of the key missions, the successful building of socialism, and the strong defense of the socialist Vietnamese homeland, we must overcome countless difficulties and complications. But there has been no time in our history that our nation and our people have been as powerful in all respects as they are today. Our people have creative talent, courage, and intelligence. Our country has a large labor force and rich, varied natural resources, and has created definite economic potential throughout the nation. We have solidarity and increasingly closer mutual assistance ties with Laos and Kampuchea. We also have the all-round cooperation of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries, and are expanding relationships with many other countries. With those advantages and strengths, it is certain that we will victoriously fulfill our present and future revolutionary undertakings. The matter that is posed for us during the present historical period is that all Vietnamese -- our entire party, population, and army -- must have full and profound consciousness of the strength and strong position of our country, and enthusiastically advance to the victorious fulfillment of the mission of building the nation and defending the homeland.

Our army, fully understanding the party line in the period of building socialism and defending the socialist Vietnamese homeland, now more than ever must, on the basis of continually improving its quality in all regards, and doing a good job of fulfilling its missions of fighting and preparing to fight in accordance with the specific situation in each place and at each time, it is necessary to launch a production movement throughout the army in order to produce much wealth for society and improve the troops' living standards, while at the same time urgently deploy forces to do economic work in accordance with the missions and plans assigned by the state.

On the basis of fully understanding the army's basic missions on the economic front and the guidance thoughts which the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee has determined for the army, which must be applied in the process of participating in economic construction, the army's economic construction plans must above all be intended to "Contribute to, along with the economic sectors and localities throughout the nation, promoting production in the agricultural, forestry, fishing, and industrial sectors, and contribute to accelerating the development of energy and mining sectors, and capital construction serving agriculture, forestry, industry, and communications and transportation, while at the same time contributing to the formation of new economic zones and settlement zones in the important areas; doing a good job of fulfilling the air transportation mission; fully utilizing the capacities, equipment, labor, and waste materials of the national defense factories and enterprises and producing additional consumer and export projects; and doing a good job of carrying out international obligations and cooperation regarding economic construction."

All of these missions are important, especially those related to agriculture. Our army must, along with the entire population, endeavor to promote agricultural production and concentrate on resolving the food problem. It must give priority to concentrating forces for the key tasks and projects, but an appropriate force must be set aside to fulfill the other economic construction missions assigned by the state.

In developing agriculture and forestry, and on the agriculture and forestry front, the army's main mission is to contribute positively and directly to practically and effectively serving capital construction and strengthening the material-technical bases. In addition to the forces of the army units specializing in economic work, the party committees must mobilize all mobilizable labor of the organs, enterprises, factories, and schools, and of the units fulfilling combat-readiness, construction, and training missions, on the production front in order to produce social wealth and improve the troops' living standards, while also contributing positively to central-level economic construction and local economic development.

The units mobilized to do economic work on the agriculture-forestry production front must concentrate their forces to a high degree in contributing, along with the agricultural and forestry sectors, to attaining the capital construction plan norms of the areas specializing in growing rice, subsidiary food crops, rubber, or coffee, in lumbering, etc. In carrying out the direction of giving priority in force distribution to the above-mentioned missions, it is essential that we set aside appropriate manpower and rationally mobilize some labor of the units fulfilling combat-readiness, construction, and training missions for the construction of local irrigation projects, the construction and development of settlement areas, and afforestation, along the lines of combining the economy with national defense, as well as growing tea and tobacco, raising water buffaloes and cattle, and growing a number of special-product crops in the piedmont and mountain regions for export, etc. In addition to fulfilling agriculture and forestry production missions, our army must also do a better job of guiding, organizing, and managing the mission of catching and raising seafood among the naval units specializing in fishing and in the units stationed in coastal areas and on islands.

The process of carrying out capital construction, mining, and the construction of fields, irrigation projects, roads and bridges, houses, warehouses, stations and camps, etc., is also a process of preparing forces to serve as the backbone of the state farms that are created in the new economic zones, and in the large specialized cultivation areas. The various echelons must fully understand that policy and have plans to organize its implementation, to be appropriate to each place and unit. It must be remembered that our troops not only concentrate their forces to meet the requirements of the economic construction mission in accordance with the state plans, but must also pay attention to mobilizing forces to meet the requirement of producing food in order to contribute to stabilizing and improving the troops' living conditions.

With regard to the industrial and mining spheres we must, along with the economic sectors, concentrate on rapidly and efficiently completing the key projects now under construction, and assure sufficient forces to participate in beginning the construction of new projects, especially those that must be constructed over a period of many years. Such projects include those which serve the requirement of promoting the energy, oil and gas, electricity, and coal and mining sectors, and directly serve the development of agriculture, forestry, industry, and exports.

On the communications and transportation front, which serves the economy and the people's livelihoods as well as national defense, we must above all strongly emphasize the fulfillment of plan norms regarding the building of roads and railroads of strategic importance with regard to the economy and national defense, in accordance with the slogan of constructing them rapidly, efficiently, and completely and bringing road segments into use as soon as they are finished. At the same time, we must make positive preparations in all respects, especially as regards the labor forces, so that when necessary we can promptly begin the urgent construction of new projects outside the predetermined plan. In addition to capital construction and the construction of bridges, roads, and wharves, we must seek all ways to fulfill the air transportation plans and have plans for fully utilizing two-way transportation facilities to serve production and travel by the people.

Developing the consumer goods industry and rapidly increasing export capabilities will be major features of state plans in future years which must be fully understood by the enterprises, factories, organs, and base-level units throughout the army. Every organ, military region, corps, armed forces branch, and combat arm that has been assigned tasks must have a strong sense of responsibility toward the full utilization of capacities, materials, equipment, time, and manpower, in order to produce additional consumer goods. That is not only a pressing requirement intended to provide consumer goods for the troops, but also helps resolve the difficulties regarding consumer goods for the people, while also creating a number of export goods, in order to, along with the economic sectors, strictly fulfill the contracts signed with other countries and meet part of the import needs of our country's economy.

The army's common production and economic construction mission at present is to concentrate its capabilities on attaining the key objectives stated above. It is especially necessary to firmly grasp the common principle in using the army to fulfill economic construction missions: in all situations it is necessary to assure that the army does a good job of fulfilling both its mission to defend the homeland and its mission of economic construction and national development.

That amounts to closely combining the military missions and the economic construction missions. Missions must be assigned to the units participating in economic construction that are appropriate to the nature, characteristics, specialized-technical strengths, actual capabilities, and potential for long-range development of each unit. Economic construction missions must be assigned on the basis of military deployments, so that in all situations the units assigned such missions can still fulfill their combat-readiness missions or can rapidly shift over to fulfill combat missions, fulfill on-the-spot combat missions, or engage in mobile combat when so ordered. As regards the forces which take turns participating in economic construction in each period of time, in general units should be assigned production and economic construction missions in or near the places in which they are stationed or are fulfilling military or combat-readiness missions. As regards the units specializing in economic construction, since they have been augmented with regard to organization and material-technical bases, it is essential that they do a good job of fulfilling their principal mission: producing with high productivity and good quality and attaining high economic effectiveness. But in order to maintain and continually increase their combat strength, and assure that under all circumstances they can fulfill their combat missions, each unit must arrange its time scientifically and appropriately in order to fulfill very well and completely their military training plans and programs and the combat-readiness plans assigned them.

In order to assure the close combination of the military and economic construction missions, a very important matter which must be fully understood by the command echelons and units, and observed very strictly and creatively, is the principle regarding the organization of forces to do economic work. Each unit that is formed must be tightly organized, in correct accordance with the organizational principles of the people's armed forces. The army units specializing in economic construction, generally speaking, must be organized in a manner appropriate to the special characteristics of production and be equal to the development of the construction missions in each period of time, but there also must be a close combination with the on-the-spot combat-readiness requirements. In the essential production bases there must be organizational planning, and they must be supplemented with additional cadres and technical workers so that when the unit shifts over to a mobile combat mission production can still be maintained and developed, in a manner appropriate to the new situation and missions.

That amounts to the selective determination of the short-range and long-range economic construction missions. On the basis of fully understanding and strictly implementing the economic construction missions that are assigned, it is necessary to give priority to selecting tasks of an urgent nature and projects which have great economic value and are directly related to the development of both the economic and national defense spheres, while also manifesting the close combination of those two spheres. After the plan norms have been determined and assigned by the government the units, no matter what their difficulties, must resolutely concentrate on fulfilling them rapidly and efficiently, with good quality, in order to bring them into use at an early date, especially as regards the key projects.

The regulations and principles regarding the use of equipment and technical materials must be strictly observed. We must not use equipment and materials intended for combat to do economic work, and vice versa, and we must not arbitrarily use equipment and materials issued by the state for economic work to fulfill other missions. We must resolutely maintain the principle of using economic equipment and materials only to do economic work, and using combat equipment and materials only for combat. All acts contrary to that principle regarding use must be quickly uncovered, and must be overcome promptly and fully.

We must observe the principle of socialist cooperation and cooperate closely with the government's economic sectors in the process of fulfilling economic construction missions. In order to do a good job of fulfilling all economic construction missions that are assigned, we must manifest a strong spirit of mastership, a will to fight and win, and a strong sense of responsibility toward the party and people, and accept and brilliantly carry out even the most difficult and complicated tasks and projects. Furthermore, we must closely cooperate with the government's economic sectors in order to have a common basis on which to determine missions that are appropriate to the over-all capabilities of the army and of each individual unit, while by that means setting forth economic-technical requirements so that the various sectors can work together in meeting them, and assuring all necessary conditions for the units to victoriously fulfill the missions assigned them.

We must observe the economic regulations and policies in the army units specializing in the economic construction missions. An urgent problem that has been posed and must be effectively resolved is the prompt determination and flexible, creative

application of the economic regulations and policies promulgated by the party and government, to be appropriate to the nature and characteristics of the military forces specializing in economic construction missions. But a common principle that must be fully understood and very strictly observed in order to assure that it brings about real results is to stimulate the increasing of labor productivity and the mobilization of a large number of people to, after they have fulfilled their military obligations, remain for a long time to consolidate and develop the newly created economic bases.

The economic construction missions the army will fulfill during coming years are very difficult and complicated and are also truly urgent. Therefore, we must have positive plans but must also make careful calculations and must urgently carry out those plans while still meeting the other requirements. We must develop the strength of military organization as rapidly and well as possible in all production and economic construction activities. We must organize and deploy forces appropriately, depending on the requirements of economic development and of the state plan tasks. It is especially necessary to have plans to concentrate strong forces for the key tasks and projects, and the products with high economic and export value. No matter what the difficulties, no matter what echelon or unit, and no matter what the sphere of production, we must strive to attain the highest economic effectiveness from the very beginning. On that basis, we must gradually raise economic effectiveness to a high level, such as that attained by the advanced production and commercial units of the state, while at the same time resolutely overcoming working methods which are arbitrary, unplanned, corrupt, and waste labor and material.

In order to assure that the above-mentioned principles are fully understood and strictly observed, and that the responsibility systems are fully carried out, when assigning and accepting economic missions we must do a good job of observing the stipulations of the Political Bureau. The Ministry of Defense and the relevant economic ministries and sectors must meet to hold specific discussions, have a clear division of labor, and strictly and fully fulfill the responsibilities that have been assigned. The problem posed here is to, by all means, develop to the maximum extent the strengths of each sector, in order to create the greatest possible combined strength on the economic construction front.

With regard to the tasks which the army performs in part, both the Ministry of Defense and the economic ministries and sectors are responsible to the upper echelon and the lower echelon with regard to the parts assigned them. The relevant economic ministries and sectors are responsible for the economic-technical aspects. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for the following:

- Organizing sufficient labor forces to assure that the army units victoriously fulfill the missions, orders and plans determined by the government.
- Leading, commanding, and managing the army units doing economic work combined with training and development in accordance with the missions assigned by the government.
- Providing all-round management with regard to personnel, party work, Youth, Under work, and political work in the army units doing economic work.

-- Being concerned with the spiritual and material lives of the troops, workers, national defense personnel, etc.

The units operating along the above-mentioned lines must fully understand, and do a good job of fulfilling, the tasks assigned by the Ministry of Defense.

With regard to the tasks performed entirely by the army, in general the army is responsible for carrying out all aspects, from preparing investment to leading, guiding, organizing, and managing production.

With regard to tasks it is now performing and the techniques of which it has mastered, the army is responsible for all aspects relevant to the completion of the tasks and projects that have been assigned.

With regard to the new tasks assigned entirely to the army by the government, the specialized ministries and general departments are responsible for preparing investment, supplying technical cadres and training technical cadres for the army. But that does not mean that all of these things are the responsibility of the sectors. The army is also responsible for, along with the sectors, creating conditions for the units fulfilling the missions.

The economic construction missions assigned to the army by the party and state, to be fulfilled during coming years, are tasks and projects of the important objectives of the third five-year national economic development plan (1981-1985).

The forces specializing in fulfilling the economic construction missions, as well as the other forces throughout the army, must, depending on the sector, task, project, or product, and on the basis of their economic effectiveness, characteristics, functions, military missions, and capabilities in all respects, determine appropriate levels, requirements, operational modes, and organizational forms. There are working methods and operational modes that are appropriate for the tasks, projects, characteristics, and capabilities of one unit but are not appropriate for the tasks, projects, and all-round conditions of other units. But all of the directions and operational modes of the army on the production and economic construction front have been delineated on the basis of fully applying the policies, viewpoints, and basic guidance thoughts of the Political Bureau resolution regarding the army's participation in economic construction in the new situation. By the good implementation of those directions and modes, we will fully utilize the strength of the entire organizational network of the people's armed forces and of the entire national defense sector to meet the requirements of the production and economic construction sector on a larger scale. They are capable of developing the great capabilities of the components of the national defense sector, by means of all organizational scales and forms. By flexibly applying the economic policies and fully utilizing the existing and future labor, time, and material-technical bases, they will enable production and economic construction to develop to a higher level in all bases, organs, military regions, corps, armed forces branches, and combat arms throughout the army. They will contribute positively to resolving an important aspect of the over-all problem of combining the economy with national defense: balancing manpower in the sphere of the entire nation and between the combat and combat-readiness requirements and the requirement of developing production. Because those operational directions and modes are carried out on the basis of combining the economy with national defense, strengthen the economy and national defense, and

mobilize the armed forces on the economic construction front at differing levels, to do different tasks, and in different areas, in order to victoriously implement the slogans, for a long time we have endeavored to fulfill, but have not yet fulfilled, the requirement of maintaining a high degree of combat-readiness and fighting skillfully while attaining high economic effectiveness in production and economic construction.

The economic construction mission is very great and urgent, and the requirements of the combat-readiness, construction, and training missions are very urgent and difficult. The immediate economic and living standards situations are still beset with many difficulties, and many difficulties are also being encountered with regard to some material-technical conditions necessary for production and construction. The troops are still deficient and weak with regard to experience and economic management and specialized-technical abilities. In that situation, a decisive matter is to launch a mass revolutionary movement that is closely tied in with strengthening the leadership of the party committees and the guidance, command, economic management organization, and production coordination of the command echelons. That revolutionary movement must be manifested by a spirit of competition in producing, economizing, and going all-out to oppose waste and corruption, and must attain the specific result of increasing labor productivity and high economic effectiveness in each base and unit, in order to victoriously fulfill the missions and plans assigned by the state. In addition to political education and motivation, a key matter at present is to immediately carry out the deployment and organization of forces, the drafting and improving of command, production management, and research systems, and the application of economic policies, in order to develop the powerful effect of the economic levers on production. At the same time, we must endeavor to assure to the highest degree possible the economic-technical conditions necessary for the troops to victoriously fulfill the economic missions assigned them, and go all-out in our concern for the living conditions of the cadres, enlisted men, and workers participating in the production activities.

It is essential that economic management, the organization and guidance of production, and the management of troops in accordance with the economic systems, statutes, and policies, and military discipline, undergo a strong transformation, and that the negative phenomena in labor and life be overcome. The functional organs, the leadership and command echelons, and the cadres, party members, and Youth Union members must clearly understand the new situation and missions, endeavor to fulfill their responsibilities and obligations, and be exemplary in carrying out the missions and policies of the party and state. It is certain that we will victoriously fulfill the missions and plans assigned by the party and state.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

EDITORIAL UNDERLINES IMPROVEMENT OF MILITIA, SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Feb 81 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Raise the Quality of the Militia and Self-Defense Forces"]

[Text] The militia and self-defense forces are armed ones which play a major strategic role in the task of defending the homeland. The task to be done for the benefit of the militia and self-defense forces is an important part of the local military task. The building of broad, stable and strong militia and self-defense forces suitable for their role and mission in the national construction and defense stage is a regular task of the party, state and people, in general, and is simultaneously an important, direct and daily task of the local party committees, administration and military organs, in particular.

Over the past years, many great achievements have been registered in building the militia and self-defense forces in numerous localities throughout the country. Many hamlets, villages, state farms, enterprises, organs, wards...have rapidly increased the numerical strength of the militia and self-defense forces. In many areas--especially along the frontier and coast lines and on sea islands--the militia and self-defense forces have become a shock force which effectively carry out activities by simultaneously performing production and satisfactorily fulfilling the task of training for combat readiness, fighting and maintaining security. A movement to build militia and self-defense forces has been vigorously conducted in many districts such as Quang Hoa, Cao Loc, Phong Tho, Quang Ha, Xuan Thuy, Tien Hai, Nam Thanh, Nghi Loc, Trieu Hai, Dien Ban, Xuan Loc, Thanh Phu...

However, there still are localities that have not yet considered it really important to consolidate the militia and self-defense forces and to raise their quality. Though representing a high ration in the total population, the militia and self-defense forces in some areas have not yet carried out activities effectively, their organizations is not yet stable and strong and their military standards and capacities are still low; this can be seen most clearly in their low degree of combat readiness, their poor maintenance of order and security and their slowness in overcoming negative practices in society.

The consolidation of national defense in the new situation requires that the various localities attach more importance to consolidating the militia and self-defense forces and to heightening their quality and that they further the building of stable and strong forces from basic units upward and constantly link this task to the fulfillment of missions directly stemming from the local situation.

Concentrating on leading, organizing and consolidating the militia and self-defense forces and heightening their quality does not mean focusing on their numerical strength and setting up oversize units regardless of real possibilities but rather means furthering the indoctrination, training and strict management of human beings, weapons and equipment, heightening discipline, keeping up good command methods and activity patterns and making sure that every member and unit of the militia and self-defense forces are politically wholesome and strong and possess a great combat power.

The quality and combat power of the militia and self-defense forces must be intensively manifested in basic units. The building of basic units is a key and, at the same time, urgent issue involved in the creation of the militia and self-defense forces' combat power. Actual facts about the building and combat performance of the militia and self-defense forces have clearly demonstrated that organizing large-scale units will not bring about high effectiveness in combat and other activities, but on the contrary, will often reduce this effectiveness in practice. As far as the militia and self-defense forces are concerned, building stable and strong basic units means investing leadership and cadres in the building of high-quality squads, platoons and companies in hamlets, villages and at work sites, state farms... Concerning the building of units at levels higher than companies in a number of areas where conditions and possibilities are adequate, it is necessary to carefully study these specific conditions, to commission these units to actual activities and to oppose manifestations of boastful formalism devoided of realistic effectiveness. To improve and raise the leadership, organizational and command standards of cadres working with squads, platoons and companies and of cadres in charge of military command standards of cadres working with squads, platoons and companies and of cadres in charge of military command in villages and enterprises is a decisive factor for building stable and strong basic units of the militia and self-defense forces.

To enable basic units of the militia and self-defense forces to carry out activities satisfactorily, tenaciously and continuously, local party committees and administrative and military organs at various levels must take care of the life of male and female combatants while they are training, patrolling, standing guard and maintaining combat readiness. On the other hand, a rational plan must be worked out to prevent these activities from greatly influencing production at installations.

The building of the militia and self-defense forces is closely and directly related to local tasks. Only by carrying out such tasks as fighting, maintaining combat readiness, ensuring political security and social order, recruiting and training will the militia and self-defense forces be able to build themselves into a highly qualified force capable of effectively carrying out activities and satisfactorily meeting the requirements arising from the task of building and defending the homeland. Conversely, only by closely associating with the fulfillment of political, military and economic tasks in their own localities will the militia and self-defense forces be built firmly in accordance with the requirements of the new situation.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

RUNAWAYS BY SEA TURNED PIRATES

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 18 Feb 81 p 3

[Article by Pham Xuan Luc: "Common Military Exploit"]

[Text] A loud cry was suddenly heard at midnight amid the whisper of the sea waves:

--Militarymen! Help! Help!

Post commander Tran Van Dao immediately got out of bed, slung his rifle across his shoulder and dashed out to the control station. Sen Sgt Hoang Nghia Binh reported:

--Some people have got into trouble and are crying for help. I propose that boats be sent out immediately.

In the dim light of the full moon, Dao saw two silhouettes floundering on the waves. He jumped into a boat, drove out and rescued the victims. Their names were Vo Tien and Le Nam of Thach Di Hamlet, Pho Thanh Village, Mo Duc District, Nghia Binh Province. They were soaking wet and suffered from cold and hunger and their clothes were tattered. They lay unconscious. The soldiers changed the clothes of these two men, lit a fire to warm them up and gave them hot milk. On recognizing the border defense combatants, the two men said in an angry tone, their eyes flashing:

--They were five pirates in a boat. This afternoon, they intercepted our boat and robbed us of oil, rice and salt. We fought them and wrestled with them but they forced us into the sea at gunpoint. These pirates must be arrested and we will show you the way.

On hearing the story, people from the nearby hamlet were angry at the pirates. Dao told them:

--They will be severely punished. I suggest that a militia platoon go with us. Please lend us a good boat if anyone of you has it.

An old man stepped out of the crowd and said:

--I am Le Oi, aged 70. Let me accompany you.

Old Le Oi's boat carried post commander, a border defense combatant and three militiamen, took the lead and went straight to the east where the fishing boats' lights could be seen. With Sen Sgt Hoang Nghia Binh, three combatants named Tien, Trong and Son and two militiamen aboard, the boat belonging to the border defense post went to the south. Keeping a fixed interval between them, the two boats made their way through the waves, their engines roaring, and they recognized each other by means of continual bursts of flashlights.

The two men named Bo Tien and Le Nam were tired after a day of sea fishing and after struggling against the pirates but they felt a resurgence of strength in sitting on the boat to lead the way. The boat speeded up and the combatants strained their eyes to find out the target which still remained unseen, however, after 3 hours of sea scouring. Old man Le Oi told post commander Dao:

- I am sure they are now in the area where the fishing lights of Tan Tien cooperative are seen. We must go there.

No sooner had the boat changed direction than Dao clapped his hands to signal the presence of the target. The circumstances were embarrassing because there were the people's boats in three directions. Dao murmured: "You are so smart hiding here!" Dao quietly took over the rudder from old man Le Oi, accelerated and drove the boat in between two people's boats and the pirates'. The ensuing big waves shook the pirates' boat, cut it off from its anchor, tilted it over and made it drift some 50 meters from the fishermen's boats. Taking this opportunity, post commander Dao used his flashlight to signal Binh's boat to come. When both boats were nearing the pirates' boat, the latter fired a volley with their AR15's at Dao's boat but the bullets missed the rear of Dao's boat. Post commander Dao turned his boat about to block the pirates' way. Meanwhile, on hearing the gunshots, the fishermen's boats which had retrieved their nets closed in on the pirates' boat according to a previous plan for coordinated action. Post commander Dao shouted out an order:

--Keep quiet and hands up, all of you! He who resists will be annihilated.

All of the pirates stood up and surrendered on seeing that our side was stronger.

This gang was originally composed of 15 persons who left Phy Khanh to take refuge abroad. On their way, they met with strong winds and big waves. After running out of oil and breaking down, their boat drifted. Ten of them were subsequently killed and dumped into the sea. The five survivors were the leaders and included [former] puppet army officers, U.S. intelligence agents and a member of a Chinese espionage group. They decided to lie in wait on the sea for isolated people to rob them of their boats, oil, rice and salt and to flee abroad after accumulating enough supplies. They seized a boat belonging to a man named Vo Dang from Phu Khanh and pushed the four persons aboard into the sea. On their way, they posed as fishermen and successively plundered four other boats. On seeing the large boat of Vo Tien and Le Nam, they rushed at it. Realizing that they had met with bad elements, these two men prepared to resist but were thrown into the sea by the gun wielding pirates.

Thus, after a 4-hour pursuit, our side encircled and caught these bad elements together with all the evidence and people's property.

The day dawned again on the Sa Huynh sea area. The local people went out to welcome the border defense combatants and their beloved ones. Everyone was happy and they told one another: "Defending security in the sea area is a common military exploit of the border defense post and the local people."

9332

CSO: 4209/281

EDITORIAL URGES RATIONAL WORK NORM ACHIEVEMENT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Apr 81 p 1

/Editorial: "Rational Work Norms"/

/Text/ Complying with Decision 133 CP of the Government on labor norms, many enterprises in Haiphong, Ha Nam Ninh, Ho Chi Minh City, etc. have made progress in management, plan auditing, strengthening labor discipline and piece-work wages. A number of primary level units have established norms for both primary and by-products. A number of sectors and local areas have had norms of the sector and locality for common tasks. The Bac Son Cigarette, Sao Vang Rubber and Van Dien Battery enterprises, brought into the present labor norm system and with the technology stipulated for producing each type of product, have calculated full labor expenses for each product unit and set wage norms in accordance with the volume of products delivered on a more dependable basis.

A relatively universal condition at the present time is that the establishment of labor norms is not yet truly emphasized. Many jobs have no norms. Some primary level units establish norms in a rigid fashion and when specific conditions change, the old norms are still applied and consequently are unachievable. There is also a tendency to assign norms lower than capabilities; a new laborer completes a job in about half the time set by the system and at times exceeds norms without the need for innovations to improve technology or organization. Relying on low norms for calculating the labor structure causes the number of laborers to rapidly increase and products to slowly increase; labor productivity declines, wage expenses are extremely large but income in wages is still low and products obtained by the state do not answer minimum quantitative standards.

To truly manage economy in accordance with the socialist business formula, improved planning and conducted economic auditing are necessary, and it is impossible not to carry out good labor norm establishment. To pay wages in accordance with labor results, standards with a scientific basis must be set forth in order to evaluate those results. Labor results are reflected by time, product volume, conservation, profit, etc. norms. Evaluation only carries a social nature when society sets labor norms for each individual, team, unit, enterprise and agency and regularly inspects achievement of those norms. Labor norms are set based on normal labor conditions and expressed under many different forms: time norms, product norms and establishing organization or mission with norms. Under the time wage system, labor norms are the length of time to accomplish a job in accordance with stipulated law. If a task is done in less time than the norm, wages received are lower than the level that should be received. If the job is done in a much longer time, wages are higher.

Under the product wage system, if the product norms are not achieved, wages are lower than the wage level which should be received. If product norms are exceeded, wages are higher. Similar principles are applied in the organized of cash awards. Therefore, labor norm quality and the level of norm achievement must become a standard in evaluating labor results while establishing wage and award forms and systems.

Concerning each enterprise, under the present situation, the best method for stimulating production and increasing the income of the cadres and workers is not to lower labor norms but on the contrary, to achieve progressive norms. Within the scope of wages paid, if current norms are still low, a job accomplished by 10 men but actually requiring only seven, it is better to make arrangements for seven men to do the job but still receive the wages of 10; and the three surplus individuals can be deployed in other useful jobs. In product wages, if a job is stipulated as making seven products per shift with a wage of 3 dong but 10 products can actually be produced, a norm of 10 products with a wage of 4 dong is better and if all 10 products are not produced, not only will the 4 dong not be received but also any cash award. Such a method is more favorable than continuing to maintain low norms. Progressive norms both assure an increased income for the laborer (thanks to establishing and exceeding new norms) and assure that the enterprise enjoys much greater profits (thanks to completing a higher plan) and that society has many products (thanks to every individual achieving new norms). This is a method of harmonious coordination between the three interests.

A prerequisite for establishing and achieving rational and progressive labor norms is to rearrange production, strengthen the raw material base, regularly combine labor strength with production material and actively apply scientific and technical progress while simultaneously assuring minimum standards for the laborer.

Implementation of Decision 25 CP and 26 CP of the Government promulgated at the beginning of this year demands that the amount of work accomplished with labor norms must be great. The quality of present norms must be reexamined and norms established for those jobs which still have none. Gradually establish and promulgate the unified norms of the state and establish and promulgate sector and local norms as stipulated by Decision 133 CP. On the basis of establishing sufficient norms for each step in accordance with production technology, advance toward calculating complete labor expenditures for each product unit and consider the necessary social labor expenses in order to have a dependable and stable base aimed at wage norms for each product unit. The state assigns funds to enterprises, enterprises assign funds to shops and production units and shops and production units assign jobs to each worker, all based on rational norms. Correcting, improving and raising the quality of labor norms during the new situation is a revolutionary movement. Every worker and civil servant must achieve these labor norms, both as a right and an obligation. Management, technical, economic and professional cadres have a mission of serving the workers and civil servants in achieving progressive labor norms.

7300

CSO: 4209/273

LABOR

AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES IMPLEMENT PRODUCT CONTRACTS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 2 Apr 81 pp 1, 4

/Editorial: "Production Units and Product Contracts"/

/Text/ In the agricultural cooperative production structure, the production unit is defined as the most basic and primary labor production form, serving a function as the unit accepting and organizing achievement of the cooperative's contract assignment plan. It accepts responsibility for delivering all products in accordance with the "three contract" cooperative plan and conducting internal accounting. Besides its economic mission, the production unit is also responsible for caring for and organizing the material, cultural and social lives of the cooperative members.

Along with the production unit, there are also service units and teams (also known as specialist units and teams) of the cooperative with a mission of working each task and job with the objective of directly serving the production unit to complete the plan in a favorable manner.

Practice in the cooperativization movement has indicated that the degree that the cooperative is strengthened and developed and the production plan is achieved is dependent primarily on the strength of the production unit. Every expression of weakening or neglecting the production unit is wrong. Generally speaking however, with the exception of the progressive cooperatives--production units in nearly all cooperatives are still defective in many aspects with insufficient strength to fulfill their mission. A universal occurrence is that the labor structure is inconsistent with a number of skilled young and healthy laborers withdrawn to supplement trade and specialist teams and units or sent to fulfill their state obligations. The material and technical base and the labor equipment of the unit are steadily decreased. The management standards of the cadres are still substandard and confused in task control.

The reasons for a weak production unit are many but directly and primarily are due to the fact that the cooperative management levels do not fully recognize or emphasize the function of the production unit; commonly placing it on a level or even lower than the position of other units in the cooperative. The role and responsibility to control every aspect of the production unit (from production to distribution) has been lowered. This shortcoming regarding the production unit is being actively overcome by local areas and primary production units.

Strengthening and solidifying the production unit consists of a number of primary tasks such as: the production unit assuring respect for the production plan and

course and the technical regulations and standards stipulated by the cooperative. The size of the unit must be adjusted, labor organized and production arranged consistent with the specific conditions of each location aimed at achieving high effectiveness; and distribution made precisely in accordance with the policy and unified plan of the cooperative, assuring proper coordination between the three interests.

Product contracts are a progressive contract form; they gradually improve and raise the piece-work contract form, overcoming the weaknesses of piece-work contracting and especially connect the work of the laborer with the end-product. Consequently, the activity formula and plan of the production unit under conditions of product contracts have many aspects differing from piece-work contracts. If the product contracts are correctly achieved, the effectiveness of every job and step as well as the end-product are higher than piece-work contracts. In order to achieve the new contract method, the production unit's method of handling work must be changed.

A foremost condition in assuring that product contracting is done correctly with the greatest effectiveness is a thorough understanding in the entire task of the production unit and the spirit of Directive 100/CT of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee on the objective, requirements and principles of contracts. In accordance with these principles, the production unit must give attention to a number of primary procedural tasks as follows: the unit control committee relies on the cooperative's contract committee to organize democratic discussion among cooperative members to accurately define economic and technical norms and assure production regulation and technical standards precisely in accordance with the plan assigned by the cooperative, on that basis establishing norms in productivity, material expenditures and private and collective labor for each plot of ground and each crop. Subsequently, the unit assigns contracts to specialist groups in the unit for tasks requiring collective achievement and contracts to labor groups and individuals for work which cannot be collectively accomplished.

The art of supervision of the unit cadre is to assure harmonious coordination in the work as well as the transfer of work between the cooperative's specialist teams and units and the production units and between the specialist groups of the unit and individuals accepting contracts in accordance with the requirements of: correct amount, quality and time stipulated by the farm schedule.

The production unit also has a responsibility to assist laborers accepting contracts by creating favorable conditions for production operations; unit specialist groups must satisfactorily work the contract fields and assign the contracted individuals in a prompt manner and with proper quality. The unit supplies sufficient contract technical materials; closely follows the contract fulfillment situation of the laborer, provides prompt correction when they stray, provides assistance when they encounter difficulties and possibly reduces the size of the contract if they have insufficient strength or conditions to assure contract completion. The unit also assists the contracted individuals in recording man-days and the expenses and materials they expend in contract field production in order to subsequently assist in the unit's internal accounting.

Jobs carried out under product contract conditions demand that the unit cadres have a high spirit of responsibility, develop their energy and versatility, unceasingly raise their management and organization standards, cultivate the necessary agricultural scientific and technical knowledge and rise to complete the mission.

BIOGRAPHIC

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Chung Á [CHUNG AS]

Member of the Central Committee of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union; *Deputy Head of the Propaganda and Training Department of the Central Committee of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union; recently he was appointed to the Examination Council for the "The [Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth] Union is 50 Years Old" competition. (TIEN PHONG 24 Feb-2 Mar 81 p 1)

Hà Đăng Ân [HAF DAWNG AAN]

*President of the Vietnam Soccer Association; his article on soccer in 1981 appeared in the cited source. (THE DUC THE THAO 28 Feb 81 p 4)

Bùi Hữu Bình [BUIF HUWUX BINHR]

Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hoang Lien Son Province; he is the author of an article entitled, "S&T Work in Hoang Lien Son Province," in this issue. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC No 1, Jan 80 pp 17-19)

Nguyễn Văn Chiếu² [NGUYEENX VAWN CHIEEUR]

*Member of the Standing Committee of the VCP Committee of Long An Province; was one of the officials who met with Minister Tran Quang Huy during his recent visit to the province. (PHAP CHE XA HOI CHU NGHIA No 3-4, Jul-Sep & Oct-Dec 80 p 47)

Nguyễn Chấn [NGUYEENX CHOWN], *Major General

May be a member of the Corps [Binh Doan] located in the south or in Kampuchea that includes H.4 Regiment, H.03 Tank Brigade and M.64 Artillery Regiment; his article "We Have Faith in Our Young Soldiers" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 26 Mar 81 p 2)

Trần Diệp [TRAAF ZIEEPJ]

Deputy Head of the Industry Department of the Central Committee of the VCP; on 30 March 1981 he attended a reception by Political Bureau Member Le Thanh Nghi for delegation from the CPSU Telecommunications Department. (NHAN DAN 2 Apr 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Văn Diện [NGUYEENX VAWN ZIEENJ]

Member of the Secretariat of the Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions; recently he attended the 2nd Congress of the Minh Hai Province Trade Union Federation. (LAO DONG 12 Mar 81 p 2)

Trần Hữu Dư [TRAAF HUWUX ZUW]

Alternate Member of the VCP Central Committee; on 26 March 1981 he was part of a VCP delegation that departed the SRV to attend the 12th Congress of the Bulgaria Communist Party. (NHAN DAN 27 Mar 81 p 1)

Trần Bá Đặng [TRAAF BAS DAWNGJ], Major General

Commander of the Engineer Forces; his article "The Engineer Forces and the Missions of Carrying Out Construction Projects and National Defense" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 25 Mar 81 p 3)

Trần Đông [TRAAF DOONG]

Member of the VCP Central Committee; Vice Minister of Interior; recently he attended an awards ceremony in Lang Son Province for local public security forces. (NHAN DAN 28 Mar 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Đức Hà [NGUYEENX DUWCS HAF]

*Acting chairman of the People's Committee of Song Be Province; was one of the officials who met with Minister Tran Quang Huy during his recent visit to the province. (PHAP CHE XA HOI CHU NGHIA No 3-4, Jul-Sep & Oct-Dec 80 p 46)

Nguyễn Huân [NGUYEENX HUAAN], *Major General

Of the Engineer Branch; on 25 March 1981 he represented his branch in Hanoi at activities marking the 35th anniversary of the VPA Engineer Branch. (NHAN DAN 26 Mar 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Quý Hưng [NGUYEENX QUYS HUWNG], Doctor

*Deputy Head of the Rehabilitation and Orthopedics School [Truong Phuc Hoi va Chinh Hinh], Ministry of War Invalids and Social Welfare; his article "Rehabilitation of the Handicapped at the Basic Public Health Level" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 30 Mar 81 p 3)

Lê Khắc Hy [LEE KHAWCS KY], *Major General

*Deputy Chief of the Rear Services General Department; on 25 March 1981 he attended activities in Hanoi marking the 35th anniversary of the VPA Engineer Branch. (NHAN DAN 26 Mar 81 p 1)

[NOTE: The above individual may be one and the same as Phan Khắc Hy (PHAN KHAWCS HY) last reported in May 1978 as Deputy Chief of the Economic Construction General Department]

An Khang [AN KHANG]

*Chief of the General Affairs and Planning Department of the State Science and Technology Commission; is the co-author of an article entitled, "A Review of S&T Activities in 1980 and Some Important Tasks for 1981," published in this issue. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC No 1, Jan 81 pp 2-5)

Nguyễn Thế Khánh [NGUYEENX THEES KHANHS], Senior Colonel, Professor

Commander of the 108th Military Hospital; on 1 April 1981 he conducted Premier Pham Van Dong on a tour of his hospital. (NHAN DAN 2 Apr 81 p 1)

Vũ Đình Liệu [VUX DINHF LIEEUJ]

Member of the VCP Central Committee; Secretary of the VCP Committee, Hau Giang Province; recently he discussed physical education and sports matters with the Deputy Director of the Physical Education and Sports General Department. (THE DUC THE THAO 28 Feb 81 p 3)

Chu Huy Mân [CHU HUY MAAN]

Member of the Political Bureau of the VCP Central Committee; on 26 March 1981 he headed a VCP delegation that departed the SRV to attend the 12th Congress of the Bulgaria Communist Party. (NHAN DAN 27 Mar 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Văn Mới [NGUYEENX VAWN MOWIS]

*Deputy Secretary of the VCP Committee, Long An Province; Chairman of the People's Committee, Long An Province; was one of the officials that met with Minister Tran Quang Huy during his recent visit to the province. (PHAP CHE XA HOI CHU NGHIA No 3-4, Jul-Sep & Oct-Dec 80 p 47)

Thép Mới [THEPS MOWIS]

Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the VCP newspaper NHAN DAN; on 1 April 1981 he attended a reception for a delegation from the Lao newspaper SIANG PASASON. (NHAN DAN 2 Apr 81 p 1)

Đinh Văn Nam [DINH VAWN NAM]

Editor-in-Chief of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union newspaper TIEN PHONG; recently he was appointed to the Examination Council for the "The [Ho Chi Minh

Communist Youth] Union is 50 Years Old" competition. (TIEN PHONG 24 Feb-2 Mar 81 p 1)

Trần Hoài Nam [TRAANF HOAIF NAM]

Secretary General of the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity and Friendship with People of Other Nations; on 1 April 1981 he attended a gathering to mark the orbiting of a joint Soviet-Mongolian space team. (NHAN DAN 2 Apr 81 p 1)

Bùi Văn Ngạc [BUIF VAWN NGACJ]

*Deputy chief of the Eastern Nambo Institute of Agricultural Technology [Vien Ky Thuat Nong Nghiep Mien Dong Nam Bo], Ministry of Agriculture; is the author of an article entitled, "Five Years of Activity of the Eastern Nambo Institute of Agricultural Technology," published in this issue. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC No 1, Jan 81 pp 20-24)

Đoàn Văn Nhân [DOANF VAWN NHAAN]

*Deputy Director of the Agriculture Service, Ho Chi Minh City; his article on specialized agriculture in Ho Chi Minh City appeared in the cited source. (NONG NGHIEP 5 Mar 81 p 5)

Nguyễn Hà Phan [NGUYEENX HAF PHAN]

Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hau Giang Province; his article on improvements in meeting the 1981 plan by his province appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 2 Apr 81 p 2)

Bùi Phùng [BUIF PHUNGF], Lieutenant General

Vice Minister of National Defense; Chief of the Rear Services General Department; recently he attended a conference on rear service scientific developments. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 27 Feb 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Ngọc Quán [NGUYEENX NGOCJ QUANS]

*Deputy chief of the Department for S&T Cooperation with Foreign Countries [Vu hop tac khoa hoc va ky thuat voi nuoc ngoai], State Science and Technology Commission; he is the author of an article entitled, "Some Thoughts on S&T Cooperation with Foreign Countries," published in the cited source. (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC No 1, Jan 81 pp 25-27)

Trần Minh Sơn [TRAANF MINH SOWN]

Deputy Secretary of the VCP Committee, Hau Giang Province; Chairman of the People's Committee, Hau Giang Province; recently he discussed physical education and sports matters with the Deputy Chief of the Physical Education and Sports General Department. (THE DUC THE THAO 28 Feb 81 p 3)

Phùng Thế Tài [PHUNGF THEES TAI], Lieutenant General

Deputy Chief of Staff of the VPA; on 25 March 1981 he attended activities in Hanoi marking the 35th anniversary of the VPA Engineer Branch. (NHAN DAN 26 Mar 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Tôn Tào [NGUYEENX TOON TAOJ]

*Deputy Director, Agriculture Service, Hanoi; his article on vegetable production appeared in the cited source. (NONG NGHIEP 5 Mar 81 p 4)

Lê Trọng Tấn [LEE TRONGJ TAANS], Colonel General

Chief of the General Staff of the VPA; on 25 March 1981 he attended activities in Hanoi marking the 35th anniversary of the VPA Engineer Branch. (NHAN DAN 26 Mar 81 p 1)

Nguyễn Thành [NGUYEENX THANH]

*Assistant Curator of the Vietnam Museum of the Revolution; recently he was appointed to the Examination Council for the "The [Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth] Union is 50 Years Old" Competition. (TIEN PHONG 24 Feb-2 Mar 81 p 1)

Lê Phước Thọ [LEE PHUWOWCS THOJ]

Alternate Member of the VCP Central Committee; Deputy Secretary of the VCP Committee, Hau Giang Province; recently he discussed physical education and sports matters with the Deputy Chief of the Physical Education and Sports General Department. (THE DUC THE THAO 28 Feb 81 p 3)

Đỗ Văn Thơm [DOOX VAWN THOWM]

*Acting Secretary of the VCP Committee, My Van District, Hai Hung Province;
*Chairman of the People's Committee, My Van District, Hai Hung Province; his article "My Van District Strives to Exceed the 1981 Plan" appeared in the cited source. (NONG NGHIEP 5 Mar 81 p 7)

Hoàng Trà [HOANGF TRAF], Major General

*Deputy Commander, Rear Services General Department; a recent photo shows him visiting a woman soldier who was injured in the line of duty. (PHU NU VIETNAM 25-31 Mar 81 p 3)

Đặng Trĩn [DAWNGJ TRINHJ]

Chairman of the People's Committee, Thai Binh Province; recently he attended a conference to discuss progress in physical education and sports in his province during the past 5 years. (THE DUC THE THAO 21 Feb 81 p 1)

Đặng Hồi Xuân [DAWNGJ HOOIF XUAAN]

Vice Minister of Public Health; on 26 March 1981, in Berlin, he signed an agreement for GDR-SRV public health cooperation. (NHAN DAN 28 Mar 81 p 4)

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

5/27/81
